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Small-Scale Sicilian Fisheries 399

serve management and fish stocks have not increased. This limited local participation in
management has caused decreased compliance with all reserve rules and emotions of
alienation and anger. The same was seen in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary
(FKNMS) (Suman, Shivlani, & Milon, 1999) and the Sumilon Reserve in the Philip-
pines (Russ & Alcala, 1999). Suman, Shivlani, & Milon (1999) suggested that similar
problems that occurred in the FKNMS can be avoided through the distribution of user-
friendly educational documents, conducting surveys to determine public concern, and
the use of flexible open forums for fishers to participate in management. Moreover, the
management history in the Sumilon reserve demonstrated that for ultimate success, the
“local community must be convinced of the benefits of management and that their sup-
port must be continuous and long term” (Russ & Alcala, 1999).

The interviews found mistrust to be the main obstacle between managers and stake-
holders in both case studies. For example, artisanal fishers, especially from Marettimo,
repeatedly claimed that the Ministry of Environment and local town councils were try-
ing to force them out of a job by taking away the most profitable fishing grounds. Many
claim not to have seen any benefits from the reserve, even though it has been in effect
for a decade, and have concluded that the reserve is just another way for the govern-
ment to control access to their resources. Many fishers also believe that over the years
their concerns have been completely ignored by the director of the reserve and town
council. They believe that any promises the director makes to them are never kept and
feel that all trust has been broken between them and reserve managers. The question
now is how to restore trust between fishers and the reserve director and how to make
reserve management successful in the eyes of all stakeholders.

To alleviate animosity toward the reserve director and general discontent regarding
avenues for participation in reserve management, a comanagement (or community based)
program could be developed (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; Pomeroy et al., 1997; Russ &
Alcala, 1999). However, as there is no precedent for comanagement-based systems in
Italy, it could prove bureaucratically difficult to modify current MPA management prac-
tices. Nevertheless, creating a community-based management system in one Italian MPA
could facilitate the creation of similar systems in others. By involving the local fishers
and community in reserve management, they can learn to help others appreciate the
fragility of the resources that they depend on. Moreover, if fishers have a say in regula-
tory design and participate in management they will be less hostile toward management
and try to get others to follow them, thus increasing compliance, as has been studied in
the Philippines (Christie & White, 2000; Pomeroy, Katon, & Harkes, 2001; Pomeroy et
al., 1997). If locals are not in agreement with the management institution in place, then
no one will follow the law. Those locals that do not agree with the regulations will
continue to violate them and the institution in place will be overridden (Jentoft et al.,
1998).

Enforcement

In the GCFR, survey questions were asked concerning the adequacy of enforcement and
if it should be more severe. Responses showed that 20–50% of fishers in each village
believe the trawling ban is not adequately enforced. This is supported by observational
evidence collected during the study. At least three times per week during the study illegal
trawlers were seen fishing in the Gulf and not once was a port authority vessel observed
patrolling. The majority of fishers also feel that enforcement should be increased. These
responses reveal, and were later confirmed by observation, that the local community of
fishers perceives ineffective enforcement of the trawling ban and believe that management
officials should reevaluate and improve enforcement practices. Encouragingly, however,