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to take into consideration and the authors suggest further research would help to explain these

               observations.


                       Katherine Emery, who on a Fulbright award participated in scientific investigations in


               San Pietro in 2008, suggests that the university’s program ‘provides invaluable outreach and

               exchange between academics and fishermen’ (2010, p. 31). While this is the case, it is worth

               thinking about the process of legitimising fisher knowledge. As McGoodwin et al. suggest,


               equality between knowledge frameworks within attempts to integrate fisher knowledge is the

               exception  rather  than  the  rule  (2000,  p.    249).  Even  the  word  ‘integration’  highlights  the


               uneven  knowledge  hierarchies  in  the  context  of  fishery  management.  In  the  contemporary

               environmental order, the only way for fisher knowledge to be made relevant to the wider


               body of knowledge is for it to be proven through official scientific methods.

                       This example demonstrates the process of decontextualisation. That is, the process of

               legitimisation of fisher knowledge involves a scientific framework. Fishers’ observations of


               mistral winds are confirmed or denied by fishery scientists and science and can then become

               part of a wider knowledge pool on Atlantic bluefin. The knowledge generation process, in


               this and earlier examples of data collection, follows the path of specific to general, contextual

               to decontextual. That is, the eventual use of knowledge in the current environmental regime is


               to create data on tuna that feeds into management responses and State (EU) fishery policy.

               Fisher knowledge has a particular relationship to what Deleuze and Guattari have called State

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               science,  (Deleuze  &  Guattari  1987,  p.  362) ,  which  I  defined  in  the  introduction  of  this

               chapter. What is not appropriated into State science is de-legitimated or becomes repressed


               (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 362). In this sense fisher knowledge is a precarious knowledge

               that  exists  in  pockets  of  practices  relating  to  the  tonnara  or  goes  through  a  process  of

               legitimisation  and  decontextualisation  to  become  part  of  a  State  science.  Perhaps  it  is,  as


               Robbins has argued, the proximity to the State that allows for some kinds of knowledge to




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