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to take into consideration and the authors suggest further research would help to explain these
observations.
Katherine Emery, who on a Fulbright award participated in scientific investigations in
San Pietro in 2008, suggests that the university’s program ‘provides invaluable outreach and
exchange between academics and fishermen’ (2010, p. 31). While this is the case, it is worth
thinking about the process of legitimising fisher knowledge. As McGoodwin et al. suggest,
equality between knowledge frameworks within attempts to integrate fisher knowledge is the
exception rather than the rule (2000, p. 249). Even the word ‘integration’ highlights the
uneven knowledge hierarchies in the context of fishery management. In the contemporary
environmental order, the only way for fisher knowledge to be made relevant to the wider
body of knowledge is for it to be proven through official scientific methods.
This example demonstrates the process of decontextualisation. That is, the process of
legitimisation of fisher knowledge involves a scientific framework. Fishers’ observations of
mistral winds are confirmed or denied by fishery scientists and science and can then become
part of a wider knowledge pool on Atlantic bluefin. The knowledge generation process, in
this and earlier examples of data collection, follows the path of specific to general, contextual
to decontextual. That is, the eventual use of knowledge in the current environmental regime is
to create data on tuna that feeds into management responses and State (EU) fishery policy.
Fisher knowledge has a particular relationship to what Deleuze and Guattari have called State
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science, (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 362) , which I defined in the introduction of this
chapter. What is not appropriated into State science is de-legitimated or becomes repressed
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 362). In this sense fisher knowledge is a precarious knowledge
that exists in pockets of practices relating to the tonnara or goes through a process of
legitimisation and decontextualisation to become part of a State science. Perhaps it is, as
Robbins has argued, the proximity to the State that allows for some kinds of knowledge to
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