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8 G. D’Anna et al. / Marine Policy ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎
new A zones in Favignana and Levanzo to protect sensitive habi-
tats. Due to the difficulty of managing a multi-sectoral forum, from
time to time meetings were held separately with single sectors.
Stakeholders were informed and consulted during the meetings
but mechanisms of co-decision-making were never implemented.
The idea that biodiversity conservation can give added value to
the local economy can pave the road to the more active partici-
pation of stakeholders in MPA governance. As a result of the re-
cently adopted regulations and, according to stakeholders’ per-
ceptions as recorded in the interviews, the trend of the first 20
years of E-MPA management is now on the point of being inverted
with a likely increase in the level of participation. The lack of
transparency in the E-MPA management since the beginning also
hindered stakeholder participation in its design and management.
The feeling that ‘things happen behind closed doors’ was domi-
nant among local people. The MPA was perceived as a mix of
impositions for many and subsidies for a few, and has promoted
the pursuit of personal interests as opposed to the responsibility of
bearing efforts for attaining collective benefits. In recent years the
level of transparency has been increasing even if differences
among stakeholders still exist.
There are several Italian, Sicilian and local officials responsible postponement of the prohibition to catch fish fry.
for managing initiatives aimed at biodiversity conservation in the
E-MPA. Frequent changing of political leadership, bureaucracy,
lack of funds and institutional conflicts are the most common
causes which make officials less accountable for delivering the
actions they are responsible for. It is only recently that the E-MPA
management body has been promoting accountability.
6. Equity and justice
Among winners, artisanal fishers enjoy special rights inside the
E-MPA, moreover, they benefit from fish biomass export from the
more protected zones and gain additional earnings from pesca-
turismo. The increased number of visitors and the inflated price of
properties and house renting are positively affecting the tourism
sectors in the Egadi. However, according to most interviewees,
tourists are not attracted by the existence of the MPA. Some sta-
keholders operating in the tourism sector stated that most tourists
do not even know of the existence of the MPA, they rather come
for the beauty of the landscape and of the sea, for the presence of
archaeological sites and for the traditional tuna trap ‘tonnara’
fishery. The availability of low-cost flights to the nearby Birgi air-
port is also perceived as a strong incentive to the tourist flow.
Among the losers are trawl fishers, some local industries, some
residents, such as pensioners and young people who feel a sense of
‘dispossession’ [9] and people who cannot bear the costs of visiting
the MPA. Trawlers lose because the MPA has reduced the pro-
ductive fishing grounds where they traditionally used to operate,
but trawlers can also be considered ‘winners among losers’ be-
cause they have obtained a D zone open for trawling. The young
and the pensioners living on the islands are limited in the use of
local resources while industries are affected by the prohibition of
any form of exploitation of non-living resources.
Conservationists are winners because the E-MPA is one of the
largest MPAs in the Mediterranean, but they are also losers be-
cause of the long-lasting bad MPA management. In the E-MPA
governance structure there is no instrument aimed at achieving a
full representation of winning and losing stakeholders and at en-
suring a fair distribution of the outcomes from the MPA. Moreover,
stakeholders consider the local political powers to be more ef-
fective than courts and judicial services in promoting equity and
justice.
Please cite this article as: G. D’Anna, et al., Governance analysis in the Egadi Islands Marine Protected Area: A Mediterranean case study,
Mar. Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.12.009i
7. Uncertainty
Sources of uncertainty have been poorly addressed in the
E-MPA for about 20 years, obstructing the effective functioning of
the reserve.
First, the lack of a comprehensive body of sound scientific in-
formation prevented the availability of adequate information for
the definition of the zoning scheme. Research has been sectoral
and has lacked orientation towards specific management re-
quirements, while the rivalry among research organizations has
hampered cooperation. This has resulted in arbitrariness of deci-
sions, which prompted the perception by stakeholders that rules,
like the zoning scheme and building restrictions, could be uni-
laterally changed given sufficient political drivers.
Second, the legislative acts supporting key sectoral policies
were fragmented and disconnected, raising doubts about the long
term implementation of management initiatives in the field. This
is often the case with specific initiatives for artisanal fisheries.
Some examples were huge changes in the timing of temporal
fishing bans to allow reproduction of fish, repeated changes in the
technical specifications of traditional driftnets, and the repeated
Third, the institutional landscape contains redundant bodies
that partially overlap, with no harmonization of their competences
and decisions. As a result, a huge bureaucracy cannot provide
proposed solutions in due time. For example, the repeated post-
ponement of an updated Italian national plan for energy provision
(the current one is dated 1988) has hampered the development of
green energies.
Economic operators perceived that all decisions in the E-MPA
are subject to high levels of uncertainty, making cost-benefit
analysis unrealistic and investments risky. The selected strategy
has often been ‘do nothing’ or ‘continue business as usual’. In
addition, management measures were perceived as poorly de-
signed, transitory and subject to local political trends. Finally, en-
forcement has been generally lacking so investments aimed at
fulfilling legal requirements brought poor benefits while ‘cheating’
appeared more rewarding. The absence of penalties for the non-
observance of the MPA rules lowered the degree of compliance.
In summary, the lack of a clearly stated, shared vision promoted
the perception that current management decisions will actually
have very little influence on the future of the E-MPA. Instead, the
future appeared subjected to large uncertainty bring by upcoming
external drivers, the unpredictable composition of future political
arrangements, and erratic enforcement.
8. Conclusions
The E-MPA has proved an interesting case study that has
highlighted many institutional, legislative and knowledge gaps
that have led to inefficient management and governance of the
area over the past 20 years. The lack of an integrated MPA man-
agement plan that takes into account all activities and all priorities
in the E-MPA implied that objectives could not be fulfilled, the
measures contained in the MPA regulations could not be effec-
tively enforced, monitoring programs could not be launched and
effectiveness evaluation could not be carried out. This kind of
scenario is common to most Mediterranean MPAs, where man-
agement plans are lacking or are poorly enforced, and financial
resources are insufficient [10]. Nonetheless, although the level of
management efficiency and of governance in the whole region is
far from being homogeneous[11], examples of Mediterranean
MPAs exist where good leadership and the involvement of key
partners have produced positive outcomes [12]. On one hand,
some positive elements of governance are present in the E-MPA,