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To put the quota figures into perspective, the 2013 quota for all three Italian traps (all based

               in Sardinia and operated through the consortium)	was 165 tonnes. This amount had to be used


               over the three Sardinian traps. If one trap were out of operation then it would risk losing its


               license. As I have previously explained the break-even point according to Giuliano is 100

               tonnes per trap. With this quantity Giuliano speculates that he would reopen the cannery and

               therefore also be able to do mattanza. To put this quota into a national perspective, the overall


               Italian quota in 2013 was 1950 (Addis 2013). The majority of the quota (1451 tonnes, 74.4%)

               went to purse seine fleets, with 13.58% going to longline fleets (this was also sold on to other


               fleets), the traps received 8.46% of the quota (165t plus 66t that it purchased from longline

               fleets),  followed  by  sport  fishers  at  0.51%,  and  a  revolving  fund  of  3.03%  (Ambrosio  &


               Xandri 2015, p. 24). In the 2013 season approximately 300,000 tonnes of tuna were let go

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               from the Italian traps (Ambrosio & Xandri 2015, p. 24) .
                       There is an ever-present threat of trap closure throughout the Mediterranean, where


               the  once  thriving  tonnara  communities  no  longer  participate  in  the  activities  that  have

               defined them culturally and historically. This is the situation in Favignana, which stands as a


               reminder  of  the  uncertain  future  of  all  traps  and  the  potential  for  a  traditional  practice  to

               become  “museumified”.  The  insufficient  quota  is  not  simply  a  result  of  the  status  of  the


               Atlantic bluefin as endangered.  Rather, it is the result of the hegemonic position of purse

               seines  along  with  the  political  struggles  within  the  tuna  fishing  industry,  in  particular  the


               quota wars. Quota is the current political struggle that confronts the tonnara and other traps

               in the Mediterranean. Yet to suggest that all sides are equally placed is far from the case.


               Whether or not the narrative that I heard up and down the coast of Italy is true, that there is a

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               mafia for tuna   there is certainly an understanding that industrial fisheries have the capacity
               to lobby in the European Parliament for a greater share of quota. There is also a perception


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               that purse seines control the tuna , while small-scale fisheries do not have the resources to



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